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Fiduciary Constitutionalism: Implications for Self- 
Pardons and Non-Delegation 
ETHAN J. LEIB AND JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN*  
ABSTRACT 
The idea that public servants hold their offices in trust for subject-beneficia-
ries and that a sovereign’s exercise of its political power must be constrained 
by fiduciary standards—like the duties of loyalty and care—is not new. But 
scholars are collecting more and more evidence that the framers of the U.S. 
Constitution may have sought to constrain public power in ways that we would 
today call fiduciary. In this article, we explore some important legal conclu-
sions that follow from fiduciary constitutionalism. 
After developing some historical links between private fiduciary instruments 
and state and federal constitutions, we opine on what a fiduciary constitution 
may mean for modern issues in constitutional law. First, we argue that fiduciary 
constraint has implications for the legal validity of presidential pardons that 
are not efforts to pursue the public interest. Because the core duty of all fiducia-
ries is to be loyal to beneficiaries and not to pursue their own self-interest, par-
dons in derogation of a president’s fiduciary obligation—the command of 
“faithful execution” in Article II—are invalid. Second, we suggest that when we 
properly conceive of parts of the Constitution as best analogized to a trust 
instrument, we can both appreciate where the non-delegation doctrine came 
from and why it is consistent with the original meaning of the Constitution to 
have a more relaxed rule about delegation today. By way of conclusion, we 
meditate upon how to convert legal conclusions that flow from fiduciary fea-
tures of the Constitution into remedies that make sense for the potentially sui 
generis fiduciary law of constitutional law.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The recent re-discovery of the fiduciary foundations of state authority can trace 
itself back to Aristotle, Plato, and Cicero.1 The idea that public servants hold their 
offices in trust for subject-beneficiaries and that a sovereign’s exercise of its polit-
ical power must be constrained by fiduciary standards—like the duties of loyalty 
and care—is not new.2 But some have started to claim that this is not just a feature 
of abstract political theory. Indeed, some argue that the framers of the U.S. 
Constitution rather self-consciously sought to design “the fiduciary law of public 
power”3 in which the government’s “conduct would mimic that of the private- 
law fiduciary.”4 The newest effort to excavate this constitutional history—an 
enterprise which might be said to have been commenced in earnest by Robert 
Natelson5—is Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman’s “A Great Power of Attorney:” 
Understanding the Fiduciary Constitution.6 The book is impressive in laying fur-
ther groundwork to the project of what we might call fiduciary constitutionalism.7 
Rather than summarizing the work of Natelson, Lawson, and Seidman here we 
emphasize one seemingly explicit invocation of the fiduciary constraints of public 
1. See generally Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General 
Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239 (2007) [hereinafter 
Natelson, Judicial Review]; Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1077 (2004). 
2. See Evan J. Criddle, Proportionality in Counterinsurgency: A Relational Theory, 87 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1073, 1090 (2012). 
3. TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 284–87 (2010). 
4. Natelson, Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 245. 
5. See supra note 1. 
6. GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE 
FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (2017). 
7. This school might be said to include Natelson, Lawson, and Seidman—but also Paul Finn, and, 
perhaps, Seth Barrett Tillman. See Paul Finn, Public Trust and Accountability, 3 GRIFFITH L. REV. 224 
(1994); Paul Finn, The Forgotten “Trust”: The People and the State, in EQUITY: ISSUES AND TRENDS 
131 (Malcolm Cope ed., 1995); Seth Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor 
Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1, 20–21 (2012); Seth Barrett 
Tillman, The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause: A Reply to Professor Zephyr 
Teachout, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 180, 203, 207 (2013); see also Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. 
Galoob, Fiduciary Principles and Public Offices, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Evan 
Criddle, Paul Miller & Robert Sitkoff eds., 2018) (developing some lessons of fiduciary 
constitutionalism for the Emoluments Clause, administrative law, and the law of judging). 
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officials in the Constitution’s text and structure—and then opine on what this fi-
duciary rendering of parts of the Constitution may mean for modern issues in con-
stitutional law. In particular, in Part I we explore the Constitution’s requirement 
that the President “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”8 and the 
requirement that he take an oath to “faithfully execute the Office of President of 
the United States.”9 Lawson and Seidman note this language on a few pages in 
their most recent book—and speculate about its potential meaning.10 But this arti-
cle delves further into this language’s likely meaning, indicating how it can estab-
lish enforceable duties for public officials.11 We observe where these provisions 
likely came from—and how they serve as further evidence of the fiduciary nature 
of the U.S. Constitution, at least with respect to the President’s duties. 
Although Lawson and Seidman often disclaim legal conclusions from their 
factual findings about the kind of instrument they claim the Constitution is,12 
Parts II and III embrace two upshots for concluding that the Constitution has sub-
stantial fiduciary features that trigger fiduciary obligations. In Part II, for exam-
ple, we argue that the fiduciary constraint the Constitution imposes upon the 
President has implications for the legal validity of pardons that are not efforts to 
pursue the public interest. Because the core duty of all fiduciaries is to be loyal to 
beneficiaries and not to pursue their own self-interest, pardons in derogation of a 
president’s fiduciary obligation are invalid. And in Part III, we argue that when 
properly analogized to a trust instrument, rather than a power of attorney as 
Lawson and Seidman prefer, we can both appreciate where the non-delegation 
doctrine came from—the default rule of trust law at the time of the framing for-
bade delegation—and why it is consistent with the original meaning of the 
Constitution to have a much relaxed rule about delegation today, as trust law now 
does. Finally, in Part IV, we explore how to convert legal conclusions that flow 
from fiduciary dimensions of the Constitution into remedies that make sense for 
the potentially sui generis fiduciary law that is constitutional law. 
I. “FAITHFUL EXECUTION” AND FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Article II, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution directs that the President “shall 
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Often called the “take Care” 
clause, the underemphasized command upon the Executive here is about “faithful 
execution.” Underscoring the centrality of the directive is the fact that the only 
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
9. Id. art. II, § 1. Without calling these duties fiduciary—and focusing on “good faith” rather than the 
core fiduciary duty of loyalty—David Pozen has recently ruminated on the import of these clauses. See 
David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 907–08 (2016) (exploring the 
significance of the “faithful execution clause”). 
10. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 128–29, 131. 
11. Our much more detailed historical claims are developed in a substantial new article with Andrew 
Kent. See Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article II, 
132 HARV. L. REV. 2111 (2019). 
12. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 6, 7, 8, 169–70. 
2019] IMPLICATIONS FOR SELF-PARDONS AND NON-DELEGATION 465 
oath with a precise formulation detailed in the Constitution is the one taken by 
the President: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the 
Office of President of the United States.” The Constitution refers to many offices 
as “Offices of Trust,”13 
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (“Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States”); 
id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the 
Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from 
any King, Prince, or foreign State.”); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“[N]o Senator or Representative, or Person 
holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.”); id. art. VI, 
§ 3 (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the 
United States.”). For more on these clauses and their constitutional import, see Seth Barrett Tillman, 
Why Our Next President May Keep His or Her Senate Seat: A Conjecture on the Constitution’s 
Incompatibility Clause, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 116–17 (2009); Will Baude, 
Constitutional Officers: A Very Close Reading, JOTWELL (July 28, 2016), https://conlaw.jotwell.com/ 
constitutional-officers-a-very-close-reading/ [https://perma.cc/7NVK-33WA]. 
invoking the legal concept of trusteeship, but the 
President’s faithfulness is the one most explicitly required by the document. 
Where does this locution about “faithful execution” come from? The language 
of “faith” here feels like no accident: the concept flows from the Latin fiducia— 
meaning faith or trust—the root of the word for the private law fiduciary. New his-
torical work we developed with Andrew Kent tells a story about how these words, 
commands, and oaths had been used for centuries—at least since Magna Carta in 
1215—as a way to constrain the discretion of public officials.14 The kind of con-
straints “faithful execution” imposes turn out to look a lot like what we would say 
today are core fiduciary obligations: proscriptions against conflicts of interest and 
self-dealing, and affirmative obligations to diligently and carefully pursue the 
authorizations (and only those authorizations) conferred upon the public offi-
cials.15 From high level executive officers to more ministerial officeholders with 
some access to the public fisc, commands of faithful execution appear in statutes 
and oaths for centuries in Anglo-American history leading up to the founding. 
Although based on this historical research we do not conclude that “faithful 
execution” was drawn from private fiduciary instruments as much as it was em-
bedded for a long while in what might be called a “law of public office,” there 
are reasons to see the constraints of “faithful execution” as of a piece with core 
fiduciary obligations that attach to private law relationships. And private law 
instruments seeking to impose fiduciary-like obligations also pick up on the 
language of faithful execution. Records show invocations of the language of 
“faithful execution” in many private law fiduciary relationships: trusts,16  
13.
14. See Kent et al., supra note 11. 
15. Id. 
16. Okeden v. Walter (1738) 25 Eng. Rep. 1061; West T. Hard. 514; Okeden v. Okeden (1738) 26 
Eng. Rep. 345; 1 Atk 551; Killick v. Flexney (1792) 29 Eng. Rep. 830; 4 Bro CC 161; 7 SIR JOHN 
COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 692 (London, A. Strahan 5th ed. 1822) (“[T]he court will 
interfere, in a summary way, to compel [the attorney] faithfully to execute the trust reposed in him . . . .”); 
WILLIAM BLAIR, THE PROBATE LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS: DIGESTED AND ARRANGED (Boston, Hilliard, 
Gray, Little & Wilkins 1829) (same vis-à-vis wills); FRANKLIN G. COMSTOCK, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF 
466 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:463 
wills,17 corporate charters,18 bailments,19 
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452; See also Ryan S. Killian, Faithfully Interpreting 
‘Faithfully’ (Feb. 17, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), ssrn.com/abstract=2226297 [https://perma.cc/ 
THL3-5XCJ] (noting in a short essay on contemporaneous usage of “faithful execution” that the phrase 
was found in Blackstone, that it was “boilerplate,” a “term of art,” but also an example of the “anti- 
corruption principle animating the Constitution”).  
and statutes on factors and brokers20 
from the seventeenth century through the early nineteenth. There are also referen-
ces in master-apprentice documents, which create duties comparable to fiduciary 
guardianship.21 The same phrasing also appears in English statutes and cases refer-
ring to public officials.22 In short, there are multifarious public and private officers 
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, GUARDIAN AND WARD, AND DOWER 228 (Hartford, H.F. Sumner & 
Co. 1832) (same in Connecticut vis-à-vis the “faithful performance” of trusts). 
17. Countess of Plymouth v. Throgmorton (1795) 91 Eng. Rep. 642; 2 Salk. 784; EARDLEY 
MITFORD, THE LAW OF WILLS, CODICILS AND REVOCATIONS 4, 105 (London, W. Stratford 3d ed. 1803); 
JAMES BARRY BIRD, THE LAWS RESPECTING WILLS, TESTAMENTS AND CODICILS, AND EXECUTORS, 
ADMINISTRATORS AND GUARDIANS 58 (London, W. Clarke 4th ed. 1802); FRANCOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, 
TREATISE ON THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS: ACCORDING TO THE LAW 
OF NORTH-CAROLINA (Newbern, Martin & Ogden 1803); SIR SAMUEL TOLLER, THE LAW OF EXECUTORS 
AND ADMINISTRATORS 81 (London, J. Butterworth 3rd ed. 1814); FORMS OF PRECEDENTS, FOR THE USE 
OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, SHERIFFS, CORONERS, AND CONSTABLES IN THE STATE OF TENNESSEE 136– 
37 (Nashville, T.G. Bradford 2d ed. 1818) (requiring “faithful adherence” from apprenticeships); id at 
147 (from guardians); id. at 112 (for a sheriff’s oath for collection of taxes); id. at 116 (and for 
constables); JOHN BROTHERSON, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS INSTRUCTOR 54 (New York, J.C. 
Totten 1829); THOMAS ATTWOOD BRIDGEN, THE OFFICE OF SURROGATE, AND EXECUTOR’S AND 
ADMINISTRATOR’S GUIDE: WITH PRECEDENTS AND FORMS SUITED TO ALL CASES IN RELATION TO THE 
DUTIES OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (Albany, W. Gould 1825); COMSTOCK, supra note 16, at 
381. 
18. GEORGE CAWSTON, THE EARLY CHARTERED COMPANIES, A.D. 1296–1858, at 281 (London, E. 
Arnold 1896) (reprinting the Hudson Bay Company charter during the reign of Charles II); CHARLES 
ANSELL, A TREATISE ON FRIENDLY SOCIETIES 189 (London, Baldwin and Cradock 1835) (treasurers of 
“friendly societies”); cf. 2 GEORGE DALE COLLINSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW CONCERNING IDIOTS, 
LUNATICS, AND OTHER PERSONS NON COMPOTES MENTIS (London, W. Reed 1812) (treasurers of 
hospitals); TOULMIN SMITH, ENGLISH GILDS: THE ORIGINAL ORDINANCES OF MORE THAN ONE 
HUNDRED EARLY ENGLISH GILDS (London, N. Trübner & Co. 1892) (fourteenth and fifteenth century 
charters); 9 W.M. BYTHEWOOD, A SELECTION OF PRECEDENTS . . . FORMING A SYSTEM OF CONVEYANCING 
(London, S. Sweet 2d ed. 1828) (treasurers and overseers); Anon. (1790) 98 Eng. Rep. 792; Lofft 546 
(Lord Mansfield) (office of master of a school). 
19.
20. JOHN ARCHIBALD RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS RELATING TO FACTORS AND BROKERS 8, 
347 (London, S. Sweet 1844). 
21. For a late-nineteenth-century master-apprentice example, see THOMAS KEY, A COMPENDIUM OF 
PRECEDENTS IN CONVEYANCING (London, W. Maxwell & Son 1878). 
22. SIR RICHARD PHILLIPS, AN EPITOME OF THE LAWS & CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 45 (London 
1816); ABRAHAM JONES LE CRAS, THE LAWS, CUSTOMS AND PRIVILEGES, AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION, 
IN THE ISLAND OF JERSEY (London, Longman 1839); WILLIAM ALEXANDER ABRAM, MEMORIALS OF THE 
PRESTON GUILDS at 56 (Preston, G. Toulmin 1862) (citing statutes on seventeenth-century mayors in 
England); GEORGE ATKINSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON SHERIFF-LAW (Londong, T. Blenkarn 2d ed. 
1847); CAMERON CHURCHILL, THE LAW OF THE OFFICE AND DUTIES OF THE SHERIFF (London, Stevens 
& Son 1879); WILLIAM HENRY WATSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO THE OFFICE 
AND DUTY OF SHERIFF (London, S. Sweet 1827) (sheriffs); THOMAS POYNTER, A CONCISE VIEW OF THE 
DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN DOCTORS’ COMMONS (London, 2d ed. 
1824); JOSEPH NEWELL, INQUEST JURYMEN (London, Knight & Lacey 1825) (justices of the peace); 2 
JOHN CORRIE CARTER, ROGERS ON ELECTIONS (London, Stevens & Sons, 14th ed. 1885–1886) (election 
commissioners); JAMES CRANSTOUN, BROOKE’S TREATISE ON THE OFFICE AND PRACTICE OF A NOTARY 
OF ENGLAND (8th ed. 1925). 
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that get commanded to do their job faithfully—from American colonial charters23 
GRANT OF THE PROVINCE OF MAINE (1639), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/me02.asp 
[https://perma.cc/C6B5-6TKV] (“And likewise to all or any Inhabitants and others that shalbee or 
remayne within the said Province and Premises of them for the true and faithfull execucon and 
performaunce of theire severall charges and places.”); GOVERNMENT OF RHODE ISLAND (1641), http:// 
avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ri02.asp [https://perma.cc/YUL4-GLKM]; GOVERNMENT OF NEW 
HAVEN COLONY (1643), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ct02.asp [https://perma.cc/E2NP- 
MX8Y] (“Thirdly, to impose an oath upon all the magistrates, for the faithful discharge of the trust 
committed to them, according to their best abilityes, and to call them to account for the breach of any 
lawes established, or for other misdemeanors, and to censure them, as the quallity of the opulence shall 
require”); CONCESSIONS AND AGREEMENTS OF THE LORDS PROPRIETORS OF THE PROVINCE OF CAROLINA 
(1665), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nc03.asp [https://perma.cc/2DUM-4TU9]; CHARTER OF 
GEORGIA (1732), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ga01.asp [https://perma.cc/EVN6-YQZL] 
(officers “shall severally take an oath for the faithful and due execution of their trust”); THE 
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE PROVINCE OF EAST NEW JERSEY IN AMERICA (1683), http:// 
avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nj10.asp [https://perma.cc/7UX2-UAUV] (“[Officers] and all other 
persons of public trust, shall before they enter actually upon the exercise of any of the employs of the 
Province, solemnly promise and subscribe to be true and faithful to the king of England, his heirs and 
successors, and to the Proprietors, and he shall well and faithfully discharge his office in all things 
according to his commission, as by these fundamental constitutions is confirmed, the true right of liberty 
and property, as well as the just ballance both of the Proprietors among themselves, and betwixt them 
and the people.”); FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA (1696), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 
17th_century/pa06.asp [https://perma.cc/B5FA-6Q4V]; COMMISSION OF JOHN CUTT (1680), http:// 
avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nh08.asp [https://perma.cc/2AB5-EFSC] (New Hampshire); THE 
CONCESSION AND AGREEMENT OF THE LORDS PROPRIETORS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW CAESAREA, OR 
NEW JERSEY, TO AND WITH ALL AND EVERY THE ADVENTURERS AND ALL SUCH AS SHALL SETTLE OR 
PLANT THERE (1664), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nj02.asp [https://perma.cc/NC3M- 
3SU2]; CONCESSIONS AND AGREEMENTS OF THE LORDS PROPRIETORS OF THE PROVINCE OF CAROLINA 
(1665), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/nc03.asp [https://perma.cc/CQ8M-CP7T]; MARTIN, 
supra note 17, at 9 (oath of coroners); SAMUEL BAYARD, AN ABSTRACT OF THOSE LAWS OF THE UNITED 
STATES (New York 1804). 
to other private and public officials at the time of the founding24—and courts treat 
that language as legally significant,25 triggering what we would today call fidu-
ciary obligations. For public officers, this means avoiding acting in one’s self- 
interest and being oriented to the public interest. 
Thus, the framers’ adaptation of frequently-used “faithful execution” language 
underscores much of the evidence furnished by Natelson, Lawson, and Seidman 
to show that the framers used the Constitution to trigger fiduciary obligations 
upon public officers (though we are somewhat less convinced private fiduciary 
law was itself fully formed at the time of the founding). Part of the key to seeing 
it this way is in Article II’s mode of constraining the exercise of the President’s 
powers under the Constitution. It uses the language of faith and care to signal to 
courts and to executive officials that the President was supposed to be held to the 
23.
24. See BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, SOME ACCOUNT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA HOSPITAL (1754), reprinted in 
5 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 283 (Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1962); Bond Letter from Benjamin 
Franklin and Robert Grace to Elliott Benger (April 25, 1744), reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN 
FRANKLIN, supra at 408. 
25. Pender v. Herle (1725) 1 Eng. Rep. 1462; 3 Bro. P.C. 505 (oaths for mayor); Whitfield v. Lord Le 
Despener (1778) 98 Eng. Rep. 1344; 2 Cowp. 754 (post-masters and legal liability); King v. Fearnley 
(1786) 99 Eng. Rep. 1115; 1 T.R. 316 (town’s overseer of the poor), Drake v. Sikes (1797) 101 Eng. 
Rep. 883; 7 T.R. 113 (1797) (bailiff); Coningsby v. Steed (1795) 88 Eng. Rep. 140; 8 Mod. 192 (bailiff). 
468 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:463 
same kinds of fiduciary obligations to which corporate officers, trustees, and 
lawyers are routinely held today in the private sector. Those duties prohibit 
self-dealing and acting under a conflict of interest. And they also routinely dis-
able the ability of fiduciaries to delegate their core obligations under the fiduci-
ary instrument. 
The commands of “faithful execution” are not ultimately religious (remem-
ber the No Religious Test Clause)26 or abstract. They are used to constrain the 
exercise of power under the Constitution. Lawson and Seidman invite such an 
application of “fiduciary constitutionalism” briefly at the end of their Chapter 
Six: “When the Constitution says the President must ‘take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed,’ is it referring to any particular concrete set of obliga-
tions that amount to taking care? And when the President exercises a nondele-
gable function, such as the pardon power or the commander-in-chief power, to 
what standards can the President justly be held?”27 While they leave these 
questions open, we seek to address some aspects of those questions. We spell 
out two legal conclusions below that follow from the fact that the Constitution 
seems to impose at least some fiduciary obligations on officeholders: first about 
the President’s pardon power (Part II) and then about the non-delegation doc-
trine (Part III). In Part II, we suggest how fiduciary obligations that flow from 
Article II constrain the pardon power—and in Part III we assume arguendo 
with Lawson and Seidman that core fiduciary obligations can attach to other 
officeholders under the Constitution, notwithstanding the fact that they do not 
all—as a constitutional matter—take on the same duties and oaths that presi-
dents must under the document. 
II. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS: THE PARDON POWER 
In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court, drawing on the pardon’s royal 
origins, described the pardon power as “intrusted . . . without limit.”28 However, 
in the twentieth century, the Court shifted its understanding of the pardon and 
conceived of some limitations. Initially, the Court had adopted a justification for 
the pardon based on “grace,” derived from an interpretation of the royal preroga-
tive. But Oliver Wendell Holmes distanced the pardon from these English reli-
gious roots. In Biddle v. Petrovich, he framed the pardon as a public good, not a 
personal prerogative, embedding it within a constitutional structure: “A pardon in 
our days is not a private act of grace from an individual happening to possess  
26. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[N]o religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any 
office or public trust under the United States.”). 
27. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 129. 
28. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871) (“To the executive alone is intrusted 
the power of pardon, and it is granted without limit.”); see also Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 
380 (1866) (“The [pardon] power thus conferred is unlimited.”). 
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power. It is a part of the Constitutional scheme. When granted it is the determina-
tion of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served.”29 
More recently, the Supreme Court and lower courts have suggested that, even 
though the pardon power is broad, it might be limited by the Constitution itself. 
In Schick v. Reed, for example, the Court upheld a conditional pardon and 
explained: 
The draftsmen of Art. II, § 2, spoke in terms of a “prerogative” of the 
President, which ought not be “fettered or embarrassed.” In light of the 
English common law from which such language was drawn, the conclusion is 
inescapable that the pardoning power was intended to include the power to 
commute sentences on conditions which do not in themselves offend the 
Constitution but which are not specifically provided for by statute.30 
But the Court added: 
The plain purpose of the broad power conferred by [the pardon clause] was 
to allow plenary authority in the President to “forgive” the convicted person 
in part or entirely, to reduce a penalty in terms of a specified number of years, 
or to alter it with conditions which are in themselves constitutionally unob-
jectionable . . . [T]he pardoning power is an enumerated power of the 
Constitution and . . . its limitations, if any, must be found in the Constitution 
itself.31 
The pardon power is plenary, so Congress may not restrict it; but Schick 
acknowledges that the Constitution itself does set limits. For example, the pardon 
power may be limited by the Fourteenth Amendment.32 If a president announced 
a blanket pardon for a racial or religious group—or perhaps a preferential policy 
for female pardon applicants—the Equal Protection Clause (reverse incorporated 
against the federal government through the Fifth Amendment) would likely cur-
tail such pardons. Writing for four Justices in a concurrence in another case, 
29. Biddle v. Petrovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) (holding that the person receiving a pardon 
commuting a death sentence could not refuse it). For a particularly thorough and helpful discussion, see 
Brian C. Kalt, Pardon Me? The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 
779, 805 (1996). 
30. Shick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 263 (1974). 
31. Id. at 267. Lower courts have followed this lead to acknowledge that there may be constitutional 
limits on the pardon power. See Kass v. Reno. 83 F.3d 1186, 1193 (10th Cir. 1996); Virgin Islands v. 
Gereau, 592 F.2d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 1979); Carchedi v. Rhodes, 560 F. Supp. 1010, 1014 (S.D. Ohio 
1982) (citing Schick for the conclusion that the pardon power is “almost absolute” but is still limited by 
the Constitution itself). 
32. Cf. Osborne v. Folmar, 735 F.2d 1316, 1317 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that equal protection 
limits state pardons); Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power 
from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 617 (1991) (“If the President acted for racially discriminatory 
reasons and granted clemency to all white applicants for pardons, while denying clemency to all black 
applicants, the judiciary could review and presumably invalidate such use of the clemency power on 
equal protection grounds.”). 
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Justice O’Connor said of state clemency proceedings that “[j]udicial intervention 
might, for example, be warranted in the face of a scheme whereby a state official 
flipped a coin to determine whether to grant clemency, or in a case where the 
State arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency process.”33 This 
principle is consistent with the basic idea that there are likely limits to arbitrary 
exercises of a pardon power. 
Others have made equal protection arguments and structural arguments about 
the separation of powers to limit the pardon power.34 When a president pardoned 
a contempt of court conviction, for example, challengers raised structural argu-
ments about judicial independence and the separation of powers. But the 
Supreme Court rejected vague non-textual theories of pardon limitation.35 Here 
we suggest—consistent with Schick and the command of “faithful execution” in 
the Constitution itself—that meaningful limits are embedded in the original con-
stitutional text from 1787. 
A. A Brief History of the Pardon Power 
The pardon power of the U.S. Constitution has roots in England’s absolute 
royal prerogative.36 
James Pfiffner, Pardon Power, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION, HERITAGE 
FOUND. (David F. Forte ed., 2014), https://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/2/essays/89/ 
pardon-power [https://perma.cc/LM46-86MF]. For a more in-depth history on the Prerogative of Kings, 
see William Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 475, 476–96 (1977). 
In 1700, through the Act of Settlement, Parliament limited 
the King’s pardon power by making it inapplicable to cases of impeachment.37 
The King then broadly delegated his pardon power to the executive authority 
in the colonies.38 Further, both the Virginia Charter of 1609 and the Charter of 
New England in 1620 granted “full and absolute Power and Authority to correct, 
punish, pardon, govern, and rule.”39 However, after the Revolutionary War, some 
33. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
34. See id. Brian Kalt makes a structural and a purposive argument about self-dealing—but without 
focus on the “faithful execution” language, which we think is most relevant: 
The federal government is structured to prevent self-dealing, as evidenced by several constitutional 
provisions. A member of Congress, for instance, cannot simultaneously hold another federal office, 
and cannot resign to take a job that was created or whose pay was increased during that term of 
Congress. Congress cannot legislate a pay raise for itself that takes effect before the next congres-
sional election, and the presidential salary cannot be increased without an intervening presidential 
election. The President also cannot receive any other ‘emolument’ from the United States besides 
his salary. In other words, federal lawmakers cannot create or enhance plush, high-paying govern-
ment jobs for themselves, at least not without letting the voters review the decision.  
Kalt, supra note 29, at 794. 
35. Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 119–20 (1925) (observing that the Constitution nowhere 
expressly declares that the three branches of the Government shall be kept separate and independent). 
36.
37. See Duker, supra note 36, at 496. 
38. Id. at 497; Robert Nida & Rebecca L. Spiro, The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A Legal 
Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 197, 204 (1999). 
39. Duker, supra note 36, at 497. For a more complete history on the early colonial charters, see id. 
at 497–500. 
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states vested the pardon power with the legislature and the executive—and 
Georgia and New Hampshire vested it exclusively with the legislature.40 
Neither the New Jersey Plan nor the Virginia Plan included an executive par-
don power. Instead, the pardon was debated during the Convention itself.41 And 
the Act of Settlement was used as a model for the pardon power in the U.S. 
Constitution.42 In debates, Roger Sherman introduced a limit to the power “to 
grant reprieves until the ensuing session of the Senate, and pardons with consent 
of the Senate.”43 Alexander Hamilton supported this idea initially.44 The possibil-
ity of a shared power between the executive and legislative—just as several states 
had done—was, however, ultimately rejected.45 Luther Martin then suggested a 
ban on pre-conviction pardons, as Massachusetts had done. But he withdrew this 
proposal after James Wilson noted that pretrial pardons might be necessary to 
persuade co-conspirators to testify against their ringleaders.46 
Eventually, some delegates argued that treason should be excluded from the 
pardon power. Edmund Randolph observed that the President should not have the 
power to pardon for treason because “[t]he President may himself be guilty.”47 A 
presidential power to pardon treason, Randolph said, would be “too great a 
trust . . . . The Traytors may be his own instruments.”48 James Wilson opposed 
Randolph’s suggestion to specify treason as beyond the pardon power.49 And 
Wilson’s specific reply was telling: “[I]f [the President] be himself a party to the 
guilt he can be impeached and prosecuted.”50 Wilson took it as a given that the 
President could and would be prosecuted later—suggesting that he did not imag-
ine preemptive self-pardons would be a plausible protection.51 
See Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Shugerman, Self-Pardons, Constitutional History, and 
Article II, TAKE CARE BLOG (June 16, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/self-pardons-constitutional- 
history-and-article-ii [https://perma.cc/F52F-EPV8]. 
The final vote of 
8-2 (by state) for the ultimately broad language followed Wilson’s view that the 
pardon power includes pardons for treason and is vested solely in the President.52 
40. Id. at 500–01 (including examples of the Georgia, Delaware, New Hampshire, Massachusetts 
and New Jersey constitutions); Nida & Spiro, supra note 38, at 204. 
41. Duker, supra note 36, at 501. 
42. Id. (citing 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE CONVENTION 
HELD AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 380 (John Elliot ed., 1845) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]). 
43. Id. (citing 5 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 42, at 480). 
44. W.H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 15 (1941). 
45. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 419 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]. 
46. Id. at 426. 
47. Nida & Spiro, supra note 38, at 206 (citing 2 JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 571 
(Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1987) (1787)). 




52. Hamilton later embraced a broad pardon power that encompassed the power to pardon treason. 
See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 74, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Penguin Classics 1987). 
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But Wilson himself did not appear to conceive of self-pardons as a plausible 
option nor as a potential problem.53 
In fact, at Pennsylvania’s ratifying convention, Wilson elaborated that the 
President must be legally accountable and was a skeptic of presidential 
immunity: 
[The President] is placed high, and is possessed of power far from being con-
temptible; yet not a single privilege is annexed to his character; far from being 
above the laws, he is amenable to them in his private character as a citizen, and 
in his public character by impeachment.54 
Wilson seems to suggest again that the President should not have any special 
immunities. This paragraph is not clear evidence that Wilson understood that the 
pardon power did not include the prerogative of self-pardons, but in combination 
with his argument at the convention debates, it appears that the person who was 
the most vocal and instrumental in providing for a broad presidential pardon 
power nonetheless did not imagine self-pardons—and probably would not have 
supported such a use of the pardon power. Given that he believed the President 
was “far from being above the laws,” he may also have found self-protective par-
dons for the practical purpose of immunity problematic, too. Framers were no 
doubt troubled by a potential scenario in which the President had co-conspirators 
in an act of treason, but they did not focus on this problem, nor offer real solutions 
other than impeachment and prosecution. This is some evidence of the breadth of 
the pardon power, but also reveals at least the limit of self-dealing pardons. 
Yet one can be intertextual rather than intentionalist here: The reach of the par-
don power is informed by the President’s constitutional oath and his textual 
responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” It is ultimately 
this twin set of commands rather than whatever may have been in Wilson’s mind 
that clarifies the deep import of the President’s fiduciary obligations that flow 
from Article II. 
However, Wilson, the framer who introduced the phrase “faithful execution” 
into the text of the Constitution in the summer of 1787,55 may also have crypti-
cally suggested a kind of good-faith self-pardon as a defense of the Executive 
Branch. Wilson, in a long speech in the ratification debates, first suggested that 
statutes, after being enacted, must not be left “a dead letter” but should be  
53. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 45, at 626–27; see also Kalt, supra note 29, at 787. 
54. 5 DEBATES, supra note 41, at 480. For more on Wilson’s skepticism of presidential immunity, 
see Kalt, supra note 29, at 787; and William F. Allen, Note, President Clinton’s Claim of Temporary 
Immunity, 11 J.L. & POL. 555, 583–84 (1995). 
55. Report of Committee of Detail, IX, in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 45, at 171–72. For full 
discussion of the confusing historical record on these origins and timing at Philadelphia, see Kent, Leib, 
& Shugerman, supra note 11. 
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“honestly and faithfully executed.”56 Later, Wilson also argued for the judiciary’s 
power to invalidate legislation, and then added, “[i]n the same manner, the 
President of the United States could shield himself and refuse to carry into effect 
an act that violates the Constitution.”57 
Wilson’s utterance here is ambiguous. He did not refer to any clause of the 
Constitution, so it is unclear what would be the basis, the scope, or the application 
of this power. Some scholars have cited Wilson’s statement here as originalist 
support for departmentalism—an executive power to decline to execute a law 
that a president believes is unconstitutional.58 Wilson may indeed have been 
asserting such a power. But he may instead have been referring to the President’s 
pardon power (or a veto power, in an imprecise way). Those are the clauses that 
expressly give the President the power to check Congress on legislation. 
Wilson’s suggestion here would make sense in the context of pardons. If a 
president viewed a standing criminal statute as unconstitutional, it would be too 
late to use his veto. But he could use his pardon power to negate punishments 
based on that statute. And if Congress had passed statutes that might be used to 
punish the President for his use of executive powers, and if the President viewed 
that, in good faith, as an encroachment upon the Executive Branch and the sepa-
ration of powers, the President might protect both himself and the presidency 
with an arguably faithful self-pardon, however paradoxical that seems. This 
exception for self-pardons would turn on a complicated interpretation of what 
constitutes a good-faith interpretation of presidential power. 
B. The Pardon Power and “Faithful Execution” 
As we explained above in Part I, the command of presidential “faithful execu-
tion” in Article II creates a duty for the President that prohibits his self-dealing, 
disables his acting under a conflict of interest, and more generally requires that he 
act in the public’s interest rather than his own. Let’s return again to Oliver 
Wendell Holmes in Biddle: “A pardon . . . is not a private act of grace from an 
individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the Constitutional scheme. 
When granted it is the determination of the ultimate authority that the public wel-
fare will be better served.”59 The pardon thus represents not personal prerogative, 
but requires that it be exercised only in the public welfare, according to the 
“Constitutional scheme.” That scheme, as Lawson, Seidman, and Natelson prop-
erly instruct us, is that the presidency is a “public trust” that has fiduciary obliga-
tions. Moreover, the office of the President—unlike other public officials under 
56. Statement of James Wilson at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 1, 1787), in 2 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 448, 450 (John P. Kaminski & 
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988) 
57. Id. at 451. 
58. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 920–22 (1990); 
Michael B. Rappaport, The President’s Veto and the Constitution, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 735, 767–68 
(1993). 
59. Biddle v. Petrovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) (emphasis added). 
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the Constitution—has very personally delineated obligations, as evidenced by the 
oath and the obligation of “faithful execution.” 
It is remarkable that some early state constitutions put the pardon power texts 
so close to their “faithful execution” texts. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 
1776 put the two texts immediately next to each other within Section 20.60 The 
New York Constitution of 1777 puts the two sections next to each other, in 
Sections 18 and 19,61 and so does the Connecticut Constitution of 1818.62 
Thus, the President may not pardon himself or pardon his closest associates for 
self-interested reasons. This is not because of something James Wilson uttered in 
debate but because of the oath the President utters when he is installed in his 
office and because his job requires “faithful execution.”63 
We previewed this argument in Jed Shugerman & Ethan J. Leib, This Overlooked Part of the 
Constitution Could Stop Trump from Abusing His Pardon Power, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2016), http:// 
wapo.st/2pdoIzK [https://perma.cc/ENC8-CVYD]; Ethan J. Leib & Jed Shugerman, Mueller’s 
Recourse, SLATE (Mar. 19, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/03/if-a-trump-official- 
fires-the-special-counsel-to-protect-trump-mueller-can-sue-to-keep-his-job.html [https://perma.cc/ 
4PXJ-HHEZ]. Some of our language here is drawn from these essays. 
Self-pardons should 
not pass legal muster (with the one potential exception we note above) because 
they would violate what we might call the fiduciary law of public office. If the 
President tries to pardon himself, he is engaged in blatant self-dealing, transgress-
ing both his oath and the primary prohibition to which he is subject as a fiduciary 
officer. If the President pardons associates primarily out of a motivation to protect 
his private interests, those pardons should also be invalid as disloyal to the public 
welfare. 
One might review the debates in the Convention and in ratification and find a 
dog that did not bark: if Wilson and other framers were troubled by treasonous 
conspiracies and pardons for co-conspirators, why didn’t any of them invoke the 
“faithful execution” clauses as a solution already in the text? 
One answer is that the Convention and ratification debates could not con-
sider all of the applications of the various clauses. It is too much to expect 
that the framers would have worked through all of the implications of the 
interplay between broader duties, specific powers, and hypothetical applica-
tions. By September 1787, as these debates were happening, the Constitution 
had just emerged from the Committee of Detail and then the Committee of 
Style, and the window for completing the proposed Constitution was closing, 
just as they were reading a full draft for the first time. Most of them had been 
assembled since May, through a hot summer, and there were still many 
details to work through as patience was running thin and expectations for 
60. See PA. CONST. of 1776, § 20 (“And [the president of the Pennsylvania] shall have power to grant 
pardons and remit fines, in all cases whatsoever, except in cases of impeachment; and in cases of treason 
and murder, shall have power to grant reprieves, but not to pardon, until the end of the next sessions of 
assembly; but there shall be no REMISSION or mitigation of punishments on impeachments, except by act 
of the legislature; they are also to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”). 
61. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, §§ 19–20. 
62. CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. IV, § 8. 
63.
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submission for ratification were looming urgently. These September debates 
generally focused on the final wording clause by clause, more than the rela-
tionships among the clauses. Moreover, the Convention debates are thin and 
incomplete,64 and what remains preserved from the ratification debates is 
also far from complete. Constitutional interpretation often turns on intertex-
tual readings that the framers themselves did not make explicit. 
The rule cannot be, however, that any pardon that might further a presi-
dent’s self-interest is invalid. That wouldn’t track fiduciary law, which must 
permit some possibility of mixed motives in the pursuit of the beneficiary’s 
best interests—and it wouldn’t be a workable rule of law. The question is 
rather whether the pardon is chiefly for the narrow self-interest of the 
President and clearly against the public interest. Perhaps a prime example of 
a pardon that might have been invalid under this framework was President 
Bill Clinton’s pardon of Marc Rich, whose former wife Denise Rich had 
made significant donations to the Clinton library and to Mrs. Clinton’s Senate 
campaign. Clinton’s pardon of Susan McDougal, a Whitewater witness who 
refused to testify, might also be open to question from this fiduciary perspec-
tive. Neither of these pardons appear to promote the public interest, and they 
apparently were driven exclusively by self-interest.65 Ultimately, a president 
is not allowed to put his own interests over the public interest as a fiduciary. 
That is as true in the exercise of his pardon power as it is in any other law he 
must “faithfully execute.” 
What are the applications to the presidential pardons of Sheriff Joe Arpaio— 
public interest or self-interest?—or to hypothetical pardons for President 
Trump’s inner circle and family members? Such questions would require much 
more factual investigation than we can perform here, and those applications are 
beyond the scope of this initial foray into the way the “faithful execution” com-
mands interface with the pardon power. And as noted above, a presidential self- 
pardon as a good-faith constitutional defense of the Executive Branch might 
arguably be valid, but would also raise complicated questions about motives, 
departmentalism, and judicial deference. 
Even if a general rule against self-pardons may be difficult to administer, 
our argument here can be summarized: Article II’s fiduciary duties provide a 
textual basis to limit the President’s power to pardon, which is not absolute. 
The pardon power is limited by the text of the Constitution and requires the 
President to exercise it loyally and carefully, only in the public interest and not 
in his self-interest. That is a constitutional minimum that flows from the fiduci-
ary duties of his office. 
64. MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND passim (2015). 
65. Richard L. Berke, The Clinton Pardons: This Time, Clintons Find Their Support Buckling from 
Weight of New Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2001. 
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III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS: NON-DELEGATION 
In this Part, we take it as a given that Lawson and Seidman—with Natelson 
before them—plausibly claim that the Constitution is some form of fiduciary 
instrument. The implications of that claim—which is not entailed directly by the 
“faithful execution” clauses themselves—are that other officeholders also have fi-
duciary obligations. One of the important payoffs of seeing the Constitution as a 
fiduciary instrument more broadly is that it helps us to see where the core of the 
“non-delegation doctrine” came from.66 If the document was fashioned as a fidu-
ciary entrustment to public officials, it is easier to make sense of where the idea 
comes from that officers should not delegate away the core of what they have 
been entrusted to do under the Constitution. It was black-letter law in the eight-
eenth century that certain kinds of fiduciaries had to presume that the important 
work they undertook was non-delegable. Lawson and Seidman insightfully trace 
the roots of the “non-delegation doctrine” to this structural fact about federal offi-
cers under the Constitution. They provide an enlightening explanation for some-
thing otherwise somewhat mysterious: the document actually says nothing about 
delegation—and the so-called “vesting clauses” that start each of the first three 
Articles, giving the three branches of government their core powers, do not 
demarcate anything about exclusivity or delegation.67 Lawson and Seidman’s 
book thus furnishes a nice breakthrough here, highlighting some background law 
that might have been incorporated into controlling the public fiduciaries of our 
government. Even though not all officeholders were commanded to faithfully 
execute their offices nor to take an oath to do the same, it is wholly plausible to 
conclude from other sources that the framers imagined that representatives were 
supposed to be “agents” or “trustees” (both of which are fiduciary offices). 
Yet Lawson and Seidman focus too much on the narrow non-delegation rules 
surrounding powers of attorney, and do not furnish us compelling reasons to carry 
forward old default rules for modern times. It is, of course, possible that the 
Constitution’s likeness to a power of attorney (albeit of a sui generis kind) could 
be translated into a strong presumption against delegation which might remain 
with us to this day. Yet very little argument actually appears in the book to lead 
to these kinds of conclusions. 
At one point, Lawson and Seidman write: “[W]e are quite confident that no in-
terpretive consequence of any significance turns on whether the Constitution is 
seen as a power of attorney or a trust.”68 They think there “is no obvious corpus” 
66. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 107–29 (discussing fiduciary constitutionalism’s 
lessons for delegations and subdelegations). 
67. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (enforcing a “non- 
delegation” doctrine in part based on Art. I, sec. 1, the legislature’s “vesting clause”); but see Whitman 
v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 489 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the vesting 
clauses “do not purport to limit the authority of either recipient of power to delegate authority to 
others”). 
68. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 61. They do admit later in the book, however, that real 
interpretive consequences would flow from finding the Constitution to be a fiduciary instrument closer 
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for a trust and so reject that analogy in favor of the power of attorney.69 Yet the 
word “attorney” appears nowhere in the document—and the word “trust” appears 
four times.70 Moreover, all powers of attorney expire upon the death of the 
principal,71 whereas it is routine for trusts to outlive their settlors. Still, they claim 
that “the fiduciary responsibilities of a trustee and an attorney do not differ in any 
way material to our project.”72 
Indeed, the book so often runs together the agent and the trustee that you might 
forget that from Locke and onward, trusteeship for governmental officials is the 
most common political paradigm.73 This links with one of the great debates in the 
theory of political representation, of course, which considers whether a demo-
cratic representative is best understood as a “delegate” of a constituent-principal 
on the one hand, or as a “trustee” for the constituent on the other.74 Simply put 
(and put in an overly simplistic dichotomy), the “delegate” works under very 
strict control with instructions from constituents that need to be executed; the 
“trustee” has a much wider berth of discretion to act within her authority.75 Both 
idealized forms of democratic representation are subspecies of the fiduciary form, 
true enough.76 But when one appreciates that the framers rejected instruction and 
recall77—and used the word trustee and the concept of trust way more often than 
they used the agency conception explicitly—one wonders whether the trust law 
paradigm isn’t a better fit from which to engage in analogical reasoning.  
to a corporate charter. Id. at 105–07. Yet in their delegation discussion, they emphasize that “it does not 
matter what kind of agency instrument best describes the Constitution [because the non-delegation] 
principle cuts across the entire family of agency instruments.” Id. at 112. 
69. Id. at 61. 
70. See supra note 13. Lawson and Seidman acknowledge and explain away this evidence. See 
LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 31. 
71. See 1 JOHN HOUSTON MERRILL, THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 446–47 
(1887) (collecting cases). 
72. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 62. 
73. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE, ORIGINAL, EXTENT, 
AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690); C.E. VAUGHAN, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY 
OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 143–57 (1939); J.W. GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 136–71 
(1950). 
74. See generally HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967). 
75. See Ethan J. Leib & David L. Ponet, Fiduciary Representation and Deliberative Engagement 
with Children, 20 J. POL. PHIL. 178 (2012). 
76. Id. 
77. E.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 703–76 (J. Gales ed., 1789) (rejecting a proposal to guarantee in 
the First Amendment a right of the people “to instruct their representatives”); Vikram David Amar, The 
People Made Me Do: Can the People of the States Instruct and Coerce Their State Legislatures in the 
Article V Amendment Process?, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1037, 1066–67 (2000) (observing that some 
state constitutions had a recall process at the time of the founding but that the framers opted against 
recall for federal officers). For evidence that constituent instructions were common notwithstanding the 
choice not to make it a right in the Constitution, see Kris W. Kobach, May “We the People” Speak? The 
Forgotten Role of Constituent Instructions in Amending the Constitution, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 
(1999). 
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Trusteeship was explicit in, at least, the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights,78 the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights,79 and the Connecticut Charter.80 
See CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT (1662), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ct03.asp 
[https://perma.cc/2MGL-5AKV] (granting a royal charter to the Governor and Company of the English 
Colony of Connecticut upon trust for the benefit of settlers residing in that colony). 
And there is, we suspect, a difference between trusteeship as the relevant 
model and the power of attorney/agency model: On many of the fundamental les-
sons the book draws, edging closer to trusteeship may give both higher demands 
of loyalty from fiduciaries,81 but also more permission for delegation. Public fidu-
ciaries would still be subject to ultra vires analysis for going beyond their man-
dates. And analysis of sub-delegations would still be relevant.82 But that analysis 
would likely be more forgiving of delegations because of important realities sur-
rounding the non-delegation doctrine in trust law, to which we now turn. 
The old non-delegation doctrine that comes from trust law has been deemed 
“murky,”83 even if one can tease out several justifications for why it was a long- 
standing default rule.84 One has to do with a worry about proper succession: “[i]f 
total delegation of the trust were permitted, the trustee could effectively install a 
successor trustee in the guise of agency without complying with the safeguards of 
trustee succession.”85 The application of this anxiety to democratic governance is 
palpable: By delegating lawmaking power away to agencies, there is a real con-
cern that the modes of democratic decision-making that are supposed to inhere in 
the people and their representatives is cordoned away in harder to reach corners 
of the government. 
A second justification of the old non-delegation rule for trusts was “the notion 
that the personality of the trustee is sometimes central to the purposes of the  
78. See PA. CONST. of 1776 (“[A]ll officers of government . . . are . . . trustees [of the people].”). 
79. See MD. CONST. of 1776 (“[A]ll persons invested with the legislative or executive powers of 
government are the trustees of the public.”). 
80.
81. See 2 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 1298 § 170 (1967) (“There are other 
fiduciaries such as guardians, executors or administrators, receivers, agents, attorneys, corporate 
directors or officers, partners, and joint adventurers. In some relations the fiduciary element is more 
intense than in others; it is peculiarly intense in the case of trust.”). 
82. See id. at 1388 § 171 (“Another fundamental duty owed by the trustee to the beneficiaries of the 
trust is the duty not to delegate to others the administration of the trust.”); see also THOMAS LEWIN, 
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 131 (London, A. Maxwell & Son 1839) 
(“The office of trustee, being one of personal confidence, cannot be delegated.”); CHANTAL STEBBINGS, 
THE PRIVATE TRUSTEE IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 106 (2001) (invoking the maxim “delegatus non potest 
delegare” from EDWARD BURTENSHAW SUGDEN, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF POWERS 175 (London, 
Luke Hansard & Sons 3d ed. 1821)); Elizabeth E. Baringhaus, Trustee’s Power to Delegate: A 
Comparative View, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 273 (1974) (“The traditional view of the courts in 
both England and America was that a trustee could not rid himself of his obligation as trustee by 
delegating his authority to another.”). 
83. John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA 
L. REV. 641, 650 (1996). 
84. See John H. Langbein, Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment Law, 59 MO. L. 
REV. 105 (1994). 
85. Id. at 107. 
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trust.”86 Given that the American political system is not, and has never been, a 
system of proportional representation in which voters select party slates, it would 
be reasonable to conclude that the individual personality of the public officer is 
sufficiently important that a default rule against delegation protects against 
“defeat[ing] the purpose and the reliance of [voters] in creating the trust.”87 
A third, and final, justification is cost-centered: the non-delegation doctrine 
(“clumsily”) seeks to prevent a trust from having to pay twice—for a trustee and 
a manager.88 This preoccupation with “double-dipping” could apply in politics 
too: we pay our officers to do their work, not pass the buck, as it were, and then 
require the taxpayer to fund expensive bureaucracies. 
As much sense as we can make about the old rule against delegation in trust 
law based in these justifications (and their plausible applications to politics), it is 
important to realize that “no version of the nondelegation rule proscribes all dele-
gation . . . . [I]ndeed, it has been commonplace under the [old common law] non-
delegation rule for trustees to employ lawyers, accountants, investment advisors, 
brokers, and other specialized service providers.”89 Even when drafters of the 
Restatement of Trusts “codified” the non-delegation rule, they had to admit that 
they could not identify any “clear-cut line dividing the acts which a trustee can 
properly delegate from those which he cannot properly delegate.”90 They settled 
on a list of illustrative factors, which most agreed allows de facto delegation 
across the board.91 What this means is that anyone trying to design a public non- 
delegation rule based on trust law principles will bump up against the same line- 
drawing problems which tend to erode the import of the doctrine. Moreover, as a 
practical matter, since the old non-delegation presumption for trusts was a mere 
default rule, sophisticated settlors drafted their trust instruments around it.92 
Between erosion because of hard line-drawing and settlors’ lack of interest in 
underscoring the rule, the latest Restatement93 relaxes the old non-delegation doc-
trine: “The circumstances of modern life that have resulted in ever greater spe-
cialization and expertise elsewhere in economic and administrative life affect 
trust administration as well.”94 
Lawrence Lessig’s Fidelity in Translation teaches that old legal notions should 
continue to have significance, but their shape and applications must be translated 
and updated as the context and times change.95 Here, the core principles of fiduci-
ary duties may be embedded in the Constitution, but the shape and application of 
those duties might need to change over time. Both the law of private trusteeship 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 108. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1959)). 
91. Id. at 109. 
92. Id. 
93. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 171 (AM. LAW INST. 1992). 
94. Langbein, supra note 84, at 110. 
95. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). 
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and the necessities of administration require a translation and updating as the 
non-delegation doctrine is as moribund as a trust law rule as it is in constitutional 
law. 
The “new” rule—which had already been in effect for many classes of trusts 
for decades before the adoption of the current Restatement96—not only permits 
many delegations but may even require a trustee to delegate matters outside its 
expertise: a trustee “may sometimes have a duty . . . to delegate [investment] 
function . . . in such manner as a prudent investor would delegate under the cir-
cumstances.”97 And under these delegations, the trustee pursuant to the 
Uniform Prudent Investor Act must employ “care, skill, and caution . . . in 
selecting agents, in formulating the terms of the delegation, and in reviewing 
‘the agent’s performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation.’”98 
The intention is to “strike the appropriate balance between the advantages and 
hazards of delegation.”99 
As a general matter, this effort to “strike the balance” about delegation with a 
dose of pragmatism, functionalism, and realism seems about as essential for admin-
istration of the public trust as it is for private trusts. The “new” pro-delegation rule 
—which shifts the default rule but did not disturb practice substantially—makes 
good sense for the public sphere, too.100 Thus, although it may be true at some 
level to say that the framers set in motion trustees with a presumption of the 
older non-delegation rule, it seems unclear why they wouldn’t have also under-
stood the private fiduciary law of trust administration to be subject to common 
law development. Lawson and Seidman seem to agree that the relevant benefici-
ary for our governmental fiduciaries is always “We the People” and our “poster-
ity.”101 How do we take care of our posterity if we don’t adjust to the new 
fiduciary law that is the agreed-upon better way to administer our trusts in the 
modern complex world? Lawson and Seidman do a great job of explaining 
where the non-delegation doctrine comes from: Locke and Hume, from whom 
96. As Langbein, recounts: “In recent decades a variety of special-purpose statutes reversed the 
nondelegation rule for investment and other specialized functions[:] the Uniform Trustees’ Powers Act 
in 1964, the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act in 1972, and ERISA, the federal pension 
reform law, in 1974.” Langbein, supra note 83, at 652. 
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 171 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1992). 
98. Langbein, supra note 83, at 652–53 (quoting UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9(a)(3) (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 1994)). 
99. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994). Section 807 of the Uniform 
Trust Code and section 80 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts essentially “extend[] the delegation rule 
of Section 9 of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act to all functions of trusteeship.” ROBERT H. SITKOFF & 
JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 660 (10th ed. 2017). 
100. And such is the modern law. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“Our 
jurisprudence [about delegation] has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly 
complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress can simply not do 
its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”). 
101. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 50–51, 131, 145. For more discussion on the problem of 
figuring out the relevant beneficiaries of public fiduciaries, see Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael 
Serota, Mapping Public Fiduciary Relationships, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 
388 (Andrew Gold & Paul Miller eds., 2014). 
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the framers learned some of their political theory, also imagined governmental 
trusts with the old non-delegation rule in place.102 But not wanting Congress to 
waste its time on intricacies of regulation seems like the way to have a living 
trust document that will work for ourselves and our posterity. 
There is obviously an interpretive dispute embedded in the discussion here. 
Some kinds of originalists might say: if the framers created a trust in a world 
where “no delegation” was the norm, that must be the kind of trust we should live 
under today. Notwithstanding lots of protest by Lawson and Seidman that they 
are declining to engage in “practical constitutional adjudication” with “real- 
world” application,103 they do sometimes reach clear legal conclusions. In their 
discussion of the recent Supreme Court case Yates v. United States104—a case in 
which one Captain Yates was convicted of a federal crime for throwing under-
sized fish overboard after the Coast Guard sought to use them as evidence against 
him—they conclude that the predicate regulation Yates violated105 (itself promul-
gated under an authorizing statute)106 was “pretty obviously” “unconstitu- 
tional:”107 “Assuming Congress has power to enact fishery plans pursuant to its 
power to regulate commerce, Congress does not exercise that power by telling 
executive agents to enact fishery plans.”108 
But there is a long way from observing that the Constitution is some kind of 
fiduciary instrument in some respects to the claim that all interpretive conven-
tions of those instruments are locked in time. Indeed, if the beneficiary is, after 
all, “posterity,” the framers probably shouldn’t be read to lock in a mere default 
rule109 at the time of the settling of the trust. It seems perfectly permissible to 
infer a “meta-intent” for the law to adapt to the ages, with whatever default rules 
(on delegation and otherwise) emerge in the common law over time.110 That is, 
even an originalist of a certain sort should be able to say that if the original mean-
ing of the Constitution was that it was like a trust document that was supposed to 
last for generations and for the benefit of “posterity,” the delegation rules which 
were only adopted implicitly through vague default rules often observed in the 
102. See Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, supra note 1, at 1117 (citing Locke and 
Hume); LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 117 (citing LOCKE, supra note 67, § 117). 
103. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 104. It is not for nothing that Steven Calabresi praises the 
book on its jacket for being a “must read” “about judicial interpretation” and “judicial review.” A reader 
could be forgiven for thinking that Lawson and Seidman, for all their protestations, e.g., id. at 6, 7, 8, 
169–70, have pretty specific lessons for how cases should be decided based on their theory of “mere” 
meaning rather than adjudication. 
104. 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). 
105. 50 C.F.R. § 622.37(d)(2)(ii) (2007). 
106. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852, 1854, 1857(1)(A) (2012). 
107. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 126. 
108. Id. 
109. They realize that the background norm here—even as applied to powers of attorney—was 
always capable of being drafted around. Id. at 115. True enough, the opt-out is supposed to be explicit. 
But it seems of continuing relevance that the rule was always optional rather than mandatory. 
110. Ironically, perhaps, the canonical example of a meta-intent by Framers to adapt law through the 
ages rather than freeze it in time is antitrust law. 
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breach111 could adapt to better reasoned common law over time. That better- 
reasoned common law now widely permits delegation. Thus, fiduciary constitu-
tionalism leads not to revisionism about the non-delegation doctrine in the 
modern age—but helps explain the broad outlines of the contemporary approach to it. 
Not everything, however, about delegation default rules was left vague and 
implicit in the document. As we explored above, Article II requires that the 
Executive—the President—has a special role in his capacity as public fiduciary: 
he must “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”112 This unique role 
would seem to intervene in background delegation law in a way that perhaps 
would not be as susceptible to tracking the common law over time.113 
To wit, modern fiduciary law also protects trustees from liability “for the deci-
sions or actions of the agent to whom the function was delegated:”114 “Instead, an 
aggrieved beneficiary must look exclusively to the agent, who ‘owes a duty to the 
trust to exercise reasonable care to comply with the terms of the delegation.’”115 
The Uniform Trust Code is similar on this point: the trustee is supposed to use 
“care, skill, and caution in selecting, instructing, and monitoring an agent”—and 
then is “not liable for any negligence or misconduct of the agent.”116 Rather, the 
agent is substituted for the trustee and “assumes a fiduciary role with fiduciary 
responsibility.”117 This modern fiduciary law tells us that the agencies that get 
delegations from legislators, for example, must themselves take on a fiduciary 
role—something consistent with a wide range of sources about administrative 
law and modern administrative governance.118 However, the President’s role to 
“oversee and supervise” that his entire branch is faithfully executing the law 
(from the requirement that he “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” in  
111. See, e.g., Gareth H. Jones, Delegation by Trustees: A Reappraisal, 22 MOD. L. REV. 381, 381– 
82 (1959) (arguing—based on common law cases from 1754, 1838, 1841, and 1883—that the “principle 
of delegates non potest delegare could not be applied in its full rigor” from “an early date”); SCOTT, 
supra note 75, at 1388 § 171 (“This does not mean, of course, that the trustee must personally perform 
every act which may be necessary or proper in the execution of the trust. He can properly permit others 
to perform acts which he cannot reasonably be required to perform.”). 
112. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
113. For recent insightful deep dives on faithful execution, see Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality 
of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 215 (2015); Killian, supra note 
19; Kent, Leib & Shugerman, supra note 11. 
114. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994). 
115. Langbein, supra note 83, at 653 (quoting UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9(b) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1994)). 
116. SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 99, at 661 (citing UNIF. TRUST CODE § 807(c) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2000)). 
117. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 807 cmt. g. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000). 
118. On fiduciary public administration, see, for example, Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, 
Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 YALE L.J. 1820, 1866–68 (2016); Evan J. Criddle, 
Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
441, 466 (2010); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117, 
121 (2006); Evan J. Criddle, Mending Holes in the Rule of (Administrative) Law, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 
1271, 1280 (2010). 
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the passive voice) is explicit:119 his agents do not merely stand in for him and 
assume the fiduciary role themselves, immunizing him from liability. Rather, he 
himself is commanded to take ultimate responsibility for the failures of his agents. 
That doesn’t mean his agents and agencies aren’t themselves fiduciaries—but the 
modern rule of effective immunity for the delegating trustee when that trustee is 
the President seems inapplicable because of the textual command that opts out of 
the default fiduciary law on that point. 
In sum, a careful study of the background non-delegation norms for trusts helps 
reveal that Lawson and Seidman are correct to bring to our attention where the 
otherwise mystifying doctrine came from. However, being more precise about 
how those norms were really implemented and developed over time—and how 
they were explicitly articulated when the drafters wanted to depart from common 
law defaults—helps us understand how our modern non-delegation jurisprudence 
is, after all, rather faithful to the original design. 
* * * 
These two discussions about what a fiduciary constitution may mean for us today 
do not exhaust the contemporary import of the project of fiduciary constitutional-
ism. There are likely to be further applications and studies, and deeper dives into 
historical sources. As we have hinted elsewhere, we suspect there are also lessons 
fiduciary constitutionalism provides in limiting executive removal authority.120 
The requirements of faithfulness in the Executive Branch probably also have 
119. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 128. In an ironic twist, perhaps, Lawson & Seidman see 
“both a necessity and custom or usage for chief executives to rely on subordinates for most of the actual 
implementation of law,” id., and therefore find most delegations within the executive branch wholly 
unproblematic even under the old non-delegation rule that they think is carried over from the Founding. 
What they get out of Article II, § 3 is that the duty of oversight is non-delegable; we think that provision 
is an explicit reminder that whatever default about non-delegation applies to other public fiduciaries, 
the President has a continuing legal obligation to maintain the faith of his agents and to maintain the 
fiduciary decision-making within the administrative state. Seth Barrett Tillman has suggested that 
the “faithful execution” language does not give the president authority to execute the law directly 
because of its passive language (“that the Laws be faithfully executed”). Seth Barrett Tillman, Ex Parte 
Merryman, Myth, History, and Scholarship, 224 MIL. L. REV. 481, 535 n.129, 538 n.134 (2016). 
Tillman cites Taney’s lower court opinion in Ex Parte Merryman (“[The President] is not authorized to 
execute the[] [laws] himself or through agents or officers, civil or military, appointed by himself, but he 
is to take care that they be faithfully carried into execution . . . . ”). However, the rest of Taney’s 
sentence is clarifying: “he is to take care that they be faithfully carried into execution, as they are 
expounded and adjudged by the co-ordinate branch of the government to which that duty is assigned by 
the constitution.” 17 F. Cas. 144, 149 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (emphasis added). In Merryman, the issue was 
interbranch conflict over habeas corpus. In the case of pardons, the Constitution explicitly assigns that 
duty to the President. When the President takes care that the pardon power be faithfully executed, the 
faithful execution clause extends a fiduciary duty directly to the President. The text of faithful execution 
clause, then, even if one adopts Taney’s reading, imposes a supervisory duty of faithful execution when 
other officers exercise the power, and imposes a direct duty of faithful execution when the President 
exercises the power. Passive voice does not automatically make all execution by third parties. Moreover, 
in case there had been any perceived ambiguity on this question, the Constitution’s presidential oath 
imposes this duty directly upon the President. 
120. See generally supra note 63. 
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implications for agency statutory interpretation121—and the judicial review 
thereof. We leave these teasers here only to underscore how many legal conclu-
sions have yet to be fully worked out now that Lawson and Seidman (and 
Natelson before them) have gotten fiduciary constitutionalism squarely on the 
agenda, showing how rich an enterprise it can be for originalists and non-origina-
lists alike. 
IV. REMEDIES 
Having established some legal conclusions that might follow from fiduciary 
constitutionalism, there are still a large set of remaining questions about how to 
vindicate fiduciary entrustment to public officials. Should we simply apply mod-
ern private-law fiduciary duties in federal court against officeholders? Who 
should have standing to enforce these fiduciary duties? Are the provisions for 
elections and impeachment the primary enforcement mechanisms for “general-
ized grievances” otherwise irremediable through civil process? To some extent, 
the answers to these hard design questions turn on whether fiduciary constitution-
alism should be seen as a “literalist,” “analogical,” or “translational” project.122 
A “literalist” approaches political relationships as literal manifestations of fidu-
ciary relationships. For the literalist, public officials just are fiduciaries with all of 
the legal requirements that pertain thereto. Evan Fox-Decent’s work might be an 
exemplar of the literalist approach in the context of fiduciary political theory (of 
which fiduciary constitutionalism might be a subspecies).123 Fox-Decent essen-
tially argues that fiduciary principles are “fractal” in nature because they “retain[] 
the same fundamental normative structure on any scale,”124 from “parent-child 
relations through to the state-subject relationship.”125 
An “analogical” approach, by contrast, suggests that because certain domains 
of political life bear a close resemblance to private fiduciary relationships, several 
features of public law ought to track at least the broad outline of private fiduciary 
law.126 And a third “translational” orientation takes the sui generis structure of 
public law to be a starting point, but looks to apply private fiduciary law to it 
through interpretation. Indeed, the translational approach reconfigures fiduciary  
121. See Aaron Saiger, Agencies’ Obligations to Interpret the Statute, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1231 
(2016). 
122. One of us discusses these modalities in Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, The Core of 
Fiduciary Political Theory, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 401, 413–17 (D. Gordon 
Smith & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2018). We draw on that discussion in what follows. 
123. See EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY (2011). 
124. Id. at 113. 
125. Id. at 48. 
126. Examples here include Scott R. Bauries, A Common Law Constitutionalism for the Right to 
Education, 49 GA. L. REV. 949 (2014); Malcolm Thorburn, Justifications, Power, and Authority, 117 
YALE L.J. 1070, 1098–103 (2008); Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator Insider 
Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845 (2013). 
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principles to adapt them in light of the distinctive purposes and challenges of the 
public sphere.127 
The more literal the approach, the easier it might be to assume relatively 
straightforward judicial remedies for breaches of public fiduciary obligations. 
And there is plenty of caselaw supporting that direct application in the court-
room.128 Here is how one state court puts it: 
These [public fiduciary] obligations are not mere theoretical concepts or idealis-
tic abstractions of no practical force and effect; they are obligations imposed by 
the common law on public officers and assumed by them as a matter of law 
upon their entering public office . . . . The citizen is not at the mercy of his serv-
ants holding positions of public trust nor is he helpless to secure relief from their 
machinations except through the medium of the ballot, the pressure of public 
opinion or criminal prosecution. He may secure relief in the civil courts . . .
through an action brought in his own name.129 
And there are cases in federal courts, too: One found an inspector at the 
Department of Agriculture to have enforceable public fiduciary obligations to the 
United States;130 another enforced a fiduciary duty of confidentiality against a for-
mer CIA agent.131 Even English courts at the time of the founding were holding 
public officers directly liable for breaches of their public fiduciary obligations 
through damages132 and indictment.133 English treatises suggested that violations 
of the duties of “faithful execution” could lead to forfeiture of office or civil 
liability.134 And although some early courts took more modest positions about  
127. An example of this approach is Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary 
Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 706 (2013). 
128. One of us discusses some of these cases in Leib & Galoob, supra note 118. 
129. Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 86 A.2d 201, 222 (N.J. 1952); see also Cty. of Cook 
v. Barrett, 344 N.E.2d 540 (Ill. Ct. App. 1975). 
130. See United States v. Drumm, 329 F.2d 109 (1st Cir. 1964). 
131. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). 
132. See Horsley v. Bell (1778) 27 Eng. Rep. 494, 495; Amb. 770, 773 (Ch.); see also 1 RICHARD 
BURN, ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 56 (London, 7th ed. 1809) (observing that if an apparitor [a civil servant 
who is paid from a public treasury] does not faithfully execute his office, “an action on the case at 
common law will lie against the apparitor for the falsehood committee by him in his office, besides the 
punishment inflicted on him by the ecclesiastical court for such a breach of trust.”). 
133. See R v. Bembridge (1783) 99 Eng. Rep. 679; 22 How. St. Tr. 1, 155–56 (Lord Mansfield). For 
a later application in Australia, see R v Boston [1923] 33 CLR 386, 400 (finding that paying a member of 
Parliament to put pressure on another public official is a crime even if the objective was lawful and 
beneficial to the state because members must “act with fidelity and with a single-mindedness for the 
welfare for the community”). 
134. COMSTOCK, supra note 16, at 228 (An action may lie against an administrator “upon his bond 
for faithful administration” if “it appear [sic] that the money was received by him” or “if, afterwards, 
that he has been cited to render an account by the judge of probate.”); WILLIAM CRUISE, A DIGEST OF 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY 144 § 92 (London, A. Strahan 2d ed. 1818) (“[I]n 
the grant of every office, there is a condition implied, that the grantee shall execute it faithfully;” if not, 
“the office is forfeited.”). 
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direct enforcement as a matter of equity,135 one thought the right approach was to 
use mandamus to compel public fiduciaries to perform their duties.136 Public fidu-
ciary duties, then, can have straightforward (and literal) juridical applications 
with fairly conventional remedies one would see in the private law: constructive 
trusts, accounting, injunctions, and damages with a view to disgorgement.137 
Yet translational approaches to fiduciary constitutionalism might emphasize 
some of the more site-specific remedies public law designs for breaches of the 
public trust: impeachment, electoral accountability, and modalities of informal 
oversight.138 There may be parallels to these forms of vindication and remediation 
for fiduciary default in the private law, too. But the “translationalist” should cali-
brate her remedial scheme to the special purposes of the public sphere and the 
complexity associated with representing huge classes of beneficiaries with 
adverse political interests and preferences.139 
For those committed to analogical reasoning—and Lawson and Seidman are 
pretty explicit that they embrace their “Constitution as fiduciary instrument” as a 
mere analogical approach140—it is harder to say what the right kinds of remedies 
ought to be for fiduciary defaults by public officers. Indeed, if fiduciary constitu-
tionalism is “only” an analogical enterprise, it does not seem obvious that the 
same interpretive and remedial conventions should apply to powers of attorney 
135. See Attorney-General v. Brown (1818) 37 Eng. Rep. 138, 163; 1 Wils. 323, 383–84 (Ch.) 
(holding commissioners, in a decision by Lord Chancellor Eldon, to a fiduciary duty to account to the 
AG flowing from a statutory creation of a trust for charitable purposes). Accord Attorney-General v. 
Heelis (1824) 57 Eng. Rep. 270, 274; 2 Sim & St 67, 76–77 (Ch.). 
136. See Drewry v. Barnes (1826) 38 Eng. Rep. 511, 514–15; 3 Russ 94, 104–05 (Ch.). 
137. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 306 (1910) (holding that “under [no] 
circumstances [shall] a public official . . . retain any profit or advantage which he may realize through 
the acquirement of an interest in conflict with his fidelity as an agent” because “it is a betrayal of his trust 
and a breach of confidence, and he must account to his principal for all he has received”). See also 
Bowes v. City of Toronto, (1858) 11 Moo. 463; 14 Eng. Rep. 770 (Can.) (holding a mayor’s profit from 
a conflicted transaction in trust for the city). This Canadian court observed: “With regard to members of 
a Legislature . . . who vote in support of their private interests; if that ever happens, there may possibly 
be insurmountable difficulties in the way of the practical application of some acknowledged principles 
by Courts of civil justice, which Courts, however, are nevertheless bound to apply those principles 
where they can be applied.” Id. at 524. In another direct application of public fiduciary duties in the High 
Court of Australia, a contract was set aside as against public policy because it contemplated using the 
services of a member of the Parliament of Victoria in a capacity that would focus him on “considerations 
of personal gain or profit,” disallowed by his status as a fiduciary for the public interest. Horne v Barber 
(1920) 27 HCA 494, 501 (Rich, J). 
138. For the history of using fiduciary standards in impeachment trials, see E. Mabry Rogers & 
Stephen B. Young, Public Office as a Public Trust: A Suggestion that Impeachment for High Crimes and 
Misdemeanors Implies a Fiduciary Standard, 63 GEO. L.J. 1025 (1975); Leib, Ponet & Serota, supra 
note 127, at 715–17. For discussion of other political enforcement mechanisms, see id. at 705, 728–30. 
For some historical evidence that failing to be faithful to an office could lead to its forfeiture, see 3 
CRUISE, supra note 134, at 144 § 92 (“[I]n the grant of every office, there is a condition implied, that the 
grantee shall execute it faithfully;” if not, “the office is forfeited.”). 
139. For an example of “remedial equilibration” in public fiduciary law, see Ethan J. Leib, David L. 
Ponet & Michael Serota, Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 91 
(2013). 
140. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 4, 38, 54–56. 
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and constitutional offices. That is, even if the authors are right that the 
Constitution is like a power of attorney, it does not follow that interpretive canons 
and remedial design associated with those kinds of documents should necessarily 
apply.141 Lawson and Seidman’s confidence about NFIB v. Sebelius,142 Yates v. 
United States,143 and Bolling v. Sharpe144 notwithstanding, the analogist has a lot 
of work to do to get from observation about similarity to interpretive canon and 
remedy. 
Whatever one’s mode of fiduciary constitutionalism—literal, analogical, or 
translational—it is not hard to see how it can be vindicated with respect to the 
limitations on the pardon power we specify in Part II. A prosecutor who seeks to 
prosecute a defendant with a pardon—and who doubts the validity of such a par-
don on grounds of faithless self-protection—can proceed with her prosecution. 
When the defendant invokes the pardon for a dismissal, a federal district court 
could rule on whether the pardon was faithful or in derogation of the law against 
self-dealing. Even if a president succeeds in releasing a pardoned criminal, a suc-
cessor president would not have to recognize an invalid pardon and could seek to 
detain that criminal again. The convicted criminal would surely bring a civil ha-
beas action, challenging the legality of the detention and re-imprisonment. But 
this habeas action would open an inquiry into the faithfulness and validity of the 
pardon. 
The extent to which courts will entertain the limits on the pardon power of the 
President that we have delineated here is as yet untested. If one assumes that the 
pardon power is absolute and unlimited, our suggestions here may seem alien and 
preposterous. But, as we showed in Part II, the law of the pardon power is that it 
is not absolute. Courts have explained that it is constrained by the rest of the 
Constitution and it is conventionally the duty of the courts to enforce this 
constraint. 
Ultimately, as we’ve shown here, fiduciary constitutionalism, in whatever mo-
dality, furnishes important legal conclusions—whether one is an originalist or 
non-originalist about the meaning of the document. But there is precious little to 
tell us whether the general fiduciary obligations of public office (outside the 
141. Even supposing the interpretive canons of powers of attorney bind interpreters today, these 
canons do not take us much further than “construe the authorizations strictly” rather than “liberally.” 
This may be enough for the authors to get them where they want to go, but a basic course on statutory 
interpretation would highlight that this kind of canon is observed mostly in the breach. Judges and other 
interpreters find canons this vague hard to take especially seriously—and framing effects of how a 
question is posed have a dramatic effect on what is perceived as “strict construction” and what is a 
“liberal construction.” 
142. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 91–99, conclude that Obamacare 
was unconstitutional because of the analogy of the Constitution to powers of attorney. 
143. 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 126, conclude that the regulations 
under which Yates was convicted were unconstitutional because of the analogy of the Constitution to 
powers of attorney. 
144. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 6, at 170–71, conclude that the case was 
“easy . . . to decide” because of the analogy of the Constitution to powers of attorney. 
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specific obligations of the office of President) should be enforced in courts or 
through impeachment or other political mechanisms. There is plenty of evidence 
through the ages that these non-statutory duties are justiciable in courts, but there 
is also a long tradition of using other mechanisms of enforcement, whether for 
pragmatic or other structural reasons, the further up the chain of command one 
gets.145 This isn’t the place to perfect the design of remedies for public fiduciary 
default. That conversation will surely get richer as the project of fiduciary consti-
tutionalism continues after Lawson and Seidman’s contribution to this important 
enterprise. 
CONCLUSION 
Thanks to the important work of Robert Natelson, Gary Lawson, and Guy 
Seidman, more people are beginning to see more fiduciary dimensions of the 
Constitution’s design. We have sought to add to their core findings of fact by 
exploring the ways “faithful execution” and the constitutional oath, in particular, 
reinforce certain fiduciary obligations that apply against the President, limiting his 
powers. And actual legal conclusions about how we should be governing ourselves 
and organizing our politics would seem to follow if we are to take these fiduciary 
obligations seriously. Whether these legal conclusions are to be vindicated in the 
courtroom, through elections, or by impeachments remains a pressing conversa-
tion within fiduciary constitutionalism. But as we have detailed here, for hundreds 
of years courts have found at least some breaches of the public trust justiciable, 
and we expect more courts and scholars to be weighing in on these issues in the 
coming years, which will help us figure out how to design a calibrated remedial 
approach to be faithful to the fiduciary dimensions of our Constitution.  
145. See Lionel Smith, Loyalty and Politics: From Case Law to Statute Law, 9 J. EQUITY 130 
(2015); Stephen Gageler, The Equitable Duty of Loyalty in Public Office, in FINN’S LAW: AN 
AUSTRALIAN JUSTICE 126 (Tim Bonyhady ed., 2016). 
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